The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act And The Human Rights Violations by Defeis, Elizabeth
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND
THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Elizabeth Defeis"
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was enacted in 1976
and provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
the federal courts.'
Until 1952 the United States, as a matter of grace and comity, granted
foreign sovereigns "virtually absolute immunity" from the suit in the
courts of this country. 2 The judicial branch consistently deferred to the
decisions of the political branches-in particular, those of the Executive
Branch-on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign
sovereigns and their instrumentalities.
In the first half of the twentieth century, as the commercial and
trading activities increased, the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity
gained international acceptance. Under this approach, immunity is
confined to the sovereign or public acts of the foreign state and does not
extend to its commercial or private acts. The Department of State, through
its famous Tate Letter3, embraced the restrictive theory of immunity in
1952. Thereafter, the State Department continued to advise courts on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether to extend immunity. If in a
particular case no advice was forthcoming, then the courts would
independently determine whether immunity was appropriate. By enacting
the FSIA in 1976, Congress substantially codified the restrictive theory of
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1. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentina Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d. Cir. 1987) cert. granted, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988) rev'd 488 U.S.
428 (1989).
2. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). Later, the notion of
Comity was defined as "recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
3. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Dep't. of State, to Acting Attorney
General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEPT. ST. BULL., Jan. 7, 1952, at 984-85.
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sovereign immunity.' FSIA effectively transferred the determination of the
immunity question from the Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides that foreign
sovereigns are immune from the jurisdiction of the United States courts
except under limited stated circumstances.' In order to bring a suit against
a foreign sovereign, the case has to be brought within one of the exceptions
enumerated in the Act. The relevant exceptions for the human rights
analysis are:
1. Waiver of immunity by the foreign state either explicitly
or by implication;'
2. Commercial activity exception in which the foreign state
carries on commercial activity in the United States or the
activity carried on outside of the United States territory
that has direct effect on the United States;8
These comments will first discuss the efforts that have been made to
address the human rights violations using the argument that a foreign
government waives its immunity by engaging in actions that amount to a
violation of jus cogens principles. It will then discuss the various
amendments and proposed amendments to the FSIA that would allow suites
to be brought for human rights abuses..
In discussing the waiver of immunity argument for human rights
abuses, one must start with the case of Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1989.
In that case, two Liberian corporations sued Argentine in the United States
District Court to recover damages for a tort, allegedly committed by its
armed forces on the high seas in violation of international law. The
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's attack on the neutral ship violated
international law and thus triggered the District Court's jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute (ATCA).9 The ATCA, enacted in 1982, provides
4. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 reads: "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter."
6. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 439.
7. 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(1).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
9. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT OF 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982), was originally passed as
a provision of JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The Act was not
used widely by the courts until its revival by the Second Circuit in 1980 decision of Filartiga v.
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that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United states."' 0 They also argued jurisdiction under the
general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the principle of universal
jurisdiction." The District Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, ruling that the Plaintiffs' suit was barred by the FSIA. 1
The Second Circuit reversed and held that a cause of action did exist under
the Alien Tort Claim Statute. The Court reasoned since the bombing of an
unarmed vessel on the high seas was a tort, and it was done in violation of
an international law, the ATCA conferred jurisdiction on the United States
Courts."
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding explicitly that the
FSIA was the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
government in the courts of the United States. Even if the case involves a
violation of an international law, the cause of action must fit within one of
the exceptions of the FSIA in order for the Federal Courts to have
jurisdiction.
The Plaintiffs in the Amerada Hess case argued that the international
agreements entered into by United States and the Defendants were
sufficient to create an exception to immunity under the FSIA. '4 Their
argument was based on the language of the Act which provided that the
FSIA was adopted "subject to international agreements to which the United
States was a party at the time of its enactment." ,1 They then referred to the
Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the Pan American Neutrality
Convention as constituting an implied waiver of exception under §
1605(a)(1). However, the Court ruled that the international agreements
would constitute a waiver only when they expressly conflict with the
immunity provisions. It rejected the idea that a foreign nation could waive
its immunity simply by "signing an agreement that makes no mention of
waiver of immunity to suits in the United States or even the availability of
a cause of action in the United States." 6
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980), when it conferred jurisdiction against former
Paraguayan police inspector general for the torture and death of Plaintiffs' relatives.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
11. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 428.
12. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. at 77.
13. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d at 426.
14. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
16. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442.
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In order to circumvent the unambiguous language of the Amerada
Hess case to allow suits against the foreign governments for alleged human
rights abuses, several creative arguments have been developed over the
years. Some have been based upon a jus cogens exceptions to immunity.
This argument was discussed in a creative 1989 law review article entitled
Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for
Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law. 7
In Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, Is the jus cogens argument
was urged. In that case, an American citizen who survived the Holocaust
sued the Federal Republic of Germany to recover money damages for
injuries he suffered, and slave labor he performed, while a prisoner in
Nazi concentration camps. The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia allowed subject matter jurisdiction over the survivor's
claim. However, in an opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg,
the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court decision, rejecting Princz's claim
that Germany waived its immunity by violating jus cogens norms. ,9 The
Court focused on the intent requirement that is implicit in the FSIA and
held that Germany did not display any intention of waiving its immunity by
violating these principals.2
This comment will discuss only that aspect of the case that pertains to
the claim of implied waiver of immunity.
In Princz, the Plaintiff had argued that the Third Reich impliedly
waived Germany's sovereign immunity under the FSIA by violating jus
cogens norms of the law of nations. It was argued that "A foreign state
that violates these fundamental requirements of a civilized world thereby
waives its right to be treated as a sovereign." 2'
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a jus
cogens norm is a principle of international law that is "accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character. "2 They prevail over and invalidate international agreements and
17. Adam C. Belsky, Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSL4: A Proposed Exception
to Inmrunity for Violations of Preemptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365
(1989).
18. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d. 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
19. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1176.
20. Id. at 1174.
21. Id. at 1173.
22. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 699 (1969).
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other rules of international law in conflict with them. According to the
Restatement, a state violates jus cogens, if it "practices, encourages, or
condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or
causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights."" In Princz, Justice Ginsberg
noted that the Nuremberg trials
for the first time made explicit and unambiguous what was
theretofore, . . . implicit in International Law, namely,..
and that to persecute, oppress, or do violence to
individuals or minorities on political, racial, or religious
grounds in connection with such a war, or to exterminate,
enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an international
crime.24
She noted further that "the universal and fundamental right of human
being identified by Nuremberg-rights against genocide, enslavement, and
other inhuman acts . . . are the direct ancestors of the universal and
fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens."2 Justice Ginsburg
acknowledged that it was doubtful that any state had ever violated jus
cogens norms on a scale rivaling that of the Third Reich. Thus it was
argued that interpreting the FSIA to imply a waiver where a violation of
jus cogens norms has occurred "would reconcile the FSIA with accepted
principles of international law."26
The court held, however, that the jus cogens theory of implied waiver
is incompatible with the intent requirement that is implicit in the FSIA. It
referred to the examples of implied waiver set forth in the legislative
history of the Act." These examples all arose either from the foreign
state's agreement to arbitrate, or to a choice of law, or from its filing a
responsive pleading without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.
The court also observed, "[s]ince the FSIA became law, courts have been
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702,
comment n.
24. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1174.
25. Id. at 1174 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715
(9th Cir. 1992)).
26. Id. at 1174 (citing Adam Besky, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed
Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 365 (1989)).
27. H.R. REP No. 1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 18 (1976); S. REP. NO. 1310, 94th Cong.
2d Sess., 18 (1976).
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reluctant to stray beyond these examples when considering claims that a
nation has implicitly waived its defense of sovereign immunity. "2
In sum, an implied waiver depends upon the foreign government's
having at some point indicated its amenability to suit. In the Princz case,
however, the court found, that neither the present government of Germany
nor the predecessor government of The Third Reich actually indicated,
even implicitly, a willingness to waive immunity for actions arising out of
the Nazi atrocities. Thus, the court concluded that the violation of jus
cogens norms by the Third Reich did not constitute an implied waiver of
sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Rather, a clear intention by a foreign
sovereign to waive its immunity is required before the federal court could
assume jurisdiction over human rights abuses. The court noted further that
the expansive reading of the FSIA urged by the Plaintiff would place not
only a strain on the federal courts but also, and perhaps more importantly,
upon the United States' diplomatic relations with the foreign
governments."2
However, there was a strongly worded dissent by Judge Patricia
Wald. She argued that Germany implicitly -waived its immunity by
engaging in atrocities in this case. Reminding the court that American law
incorporates international law, Judge Wald concluded that as a matter of
proper statutory construction, "the only way to reconcile the FSIA's
presumption of foreign sovereign immunity with international law is to
interpret the act as encompassing the principle that a foreign state
implicitly waives its right to sovereign immunity in United States court by
violating jus cogens norms."3°
Earlier, the Ninth Circuit has also rejected the jus cogens argument.
The 1992 case of Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina," involved
allegations of official torture against the government of Argentina. The
plaintiffs argued that when a foreign state's acts violate jus cogens, the
state is not entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to those acts. This
argument was based on the notion that jus cogens norms "enjoy the
highest status within international law,"32 and thus "prevail over and
invalidate . . . other rules of international law in conflict with them."
28. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1174 (citing Frolova v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1985)).
29. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1174.
30. Id. at 1184.
31. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. Id. at 715 (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
33. Id. at 716 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102, cmt. k).
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Since sovereign immunity itself is a principle of international law, it is
trumped by jus cogens. In short, they argued that when a state violates jus
cogens, the cloak of immunity provided by international law falls away,
leaving the state amenable to suit. The Ninth Circuit agreed that official
torture is a violation of the jus cogens principle of international law.
However, it found no implied waiver of the FSIA. The court noted that
the FSIA contains no exception to immunity based on jus cogens. It then
felt constrained to follow Amerada Hess, holding that "if violations ofjus
cogens committed outside the United States are to be exceptions to the
immunity, Congress must make them so."14
Several other lower court cases have been based on the jus cogens
exception to the immunity. Although the courts found the arguments
"appealing" and cited the law review articles with approval, they felt
themselves bound by the explicit words of the statute and the restrictive
reading given to it by the Supreme Court. They dismissed suites for lack
of jurisdiction. 11
Congress has amended the FSIA in the past to address specific
concerns. Addressing the problem of terrorism, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This Act amended
section 1605 of the FSIA by adding a new subsection, which created a new
exception to foreign sovereign immunity. Under this section United States
nationals may bring suit against foreign sovereigns for personal injury
resulting from "torture, extra judicial killing, air sabotage, hostage taking
or provision of material support or services . . . for such an act" if the
foreign state is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. 6
This amendment to the FSIA followed the original drafting pattern
used in the FSIA, and simply added an additional exception to the original
five exceptions. Although very broad, this exception has several
limitations on its applicability. The amendment will apply only if the
foreign state is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State
Department. Even if a state is so designated, courts will deny jurisdiction
if the victim was not a national of the United States, or if a plaintiff cannot
34. Id. at 719.
35. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306 (N.Y. 1996),
aff'd 101 F.3d 239, (even though Libya's connection to bombing of Pan America flight 103 was
in violation of JUS COGENS, there is no implied waiver under FSIA); Hirsh v. State of Israel, 962
F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), (denied implied waiver under the FSIA, relying on Smith).;
Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001), (implied waiver
exception under FSIA should be construed narrowly and does not include violations of jus
cogens).
36. ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT, 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(7)
(1996). States so designated include Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cuba and North Korea.
2002] 369
370 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:363
show that the offending state was afforded "a reasonable opportunity to
arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international rules of
arbitration. 3
However, as reported in the New York Times of October 25, 2001, in
the last five years, judgments under the Act have brought verdicts of
hundreds of millions of dollars and more than $200 million have been paid
from frozen assets and from the United States which has a right to recover
from those assets.38 A suit has been filed against Osama Bin Laden, al
Queda, Afghanistan and the Taliban based upon the September llth
attacks.
In addition, it should be noted that the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA) created a civil cause of action for all individuals-aliens and
United States citizens alike-who are victims of torture or extra judicial
killing. The language of the act limits the jurisdiction of the courts to suits
against individuals acting "under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation." 9 By limiting the act to individuals, the
drafters avoided the issue of sovereign immunity and the new law's
relationship to the FSIA. They did so, however, at great cost to the
effectiveness of the legislation. The tension created is evident in the
language of the TVPA itself, which expressly targets official torture, yet
does not reach the state sponsoring the activity.
An amendment to the FSIA could be made to allow for suits based
upon violations of human rights norms that violate jus cogens principles.
The reasons for providing such an exception are indeed compelling and
would create a remedy to victims of human rights violations and deter
future breaches of international human rights laws. The state violators
would no longer have protection in United States courts for their
transgressions.
It is clear from the cases that the courts are sympathetic to the loss of
the plaintiffs in cases of human rights abuses committed by state actors.
However, they have been reluctant to challenge the restrictive reading of
the FSIA because of the floodgates of litigation argument and also the
judgment that such decision is best left to the political branches of the
government. Therefore, at this juncture, any change in this act has to
come from Congress. The amendment that extends jurisdiction to
terrorism-related actions is a positive first step.
37. 28 U.S.C 1605(a)(7).
38. William Glaberson, Attack Victims Are Expected to Turn Law Against Terrorists, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001 at A9.
39. TORTURE VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2)(a) (1994).
Defeis
An amendment to the Act similar to the Anti-terrorism Act to address
the concerns regarding the scope of the jus cogens violations is warranted.
Such an exception would be a narrow one and would apply only to the
most grave human rights abusers. On a practical level, an exception
designed to cover jus cogens abuses with a narrow focus is more likely to
gain Congressional approval than a proposal that covers all human rights
abuses. In fact, several legislative proposals have been introduced to
amend the FSIA to add an exception for immunity in cases of human rights
violations but without success.10
In view of the unwillingness of the courts to accept jurisdiction
without a clear expression from Congress, it seems appropriate to urge
Congress to express such intent. Despite the fact that suits against foreign
governments could have broad political consequences, Congress has not
been hesitant to step into the area where terrorism is concerned. It could
also do so where grave human rights abuses are concerned and indeed
Amerada Hess, and its reliance on congressional intent supports this
approach.
In drafting this amendment, several questions remain. Should such
suits be limited to those states branded as terrorist states by the State
Department? Certainly, in this time of heightened political sensitivities and
awareness, there is a question as to whether it would be prudent to allow
such suits against states not on the list but are known abusers of human
rights, such as China. Should such legislation permit suits to non-nationals
as well as nationals? These questions should be answered before one can
draft an effective immunity exception to the Act.
We do not accept state-sponsored terrorism and we ought not accept
other serious violations of human rights. The 1966 Anti-Terrorism
Amendment has opened the door to restricting immunity for illegal acts. A
human rights exception to the FSIA would be consistent with that
approach.
40. H.R. 2357, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by Representative Lawrence J.
Smith), H.R. 934, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Representative Mazzoli), 14. R.
2363, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Representatives Schumer and Pallone).
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